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INTRODUCTION 
Economic sanctions provide an appealing alternative to in-
carceration in the face of state budget cuts and the increasing 
pressures of mass incarceration. In theory, monetary sanctions 
provide a measure to impose punishment on the offender with-
out incarceration, all while funding the criminal justice system. 
In many European countries, economic sanctions provide just 
such an alternative.
1
  
But once again, the United States exemplifies its 
exceptionalism in the context of punishment.
2
 Here in the Unit-
ed States, economic sanctions do not replace incarceration; ra-
ther, they supplement and extend traditional punishment.
3
 As 
 
†  Counsel, Justice Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School 
of Law. J.D./M.A. in Literature, Duke University School of Law; B.A., Spelman 
College. The author thanks Alicia Bannon, Kevin Reitz, and Deuel Ross for 
their helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article. Special thanks to the 
entire Minnesota Law Review for the invitation to participate in the 2014 
Symposium, Offenders in the Community: Reshaping Sentencing and Supervi-
sion. Additional thanks to Hannah Kirshner for her research assistance. All 
errors are my own. Copyright © 2014 by Jessica M. Eaglin. 
 1. See Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: 
Monetary Sanctions As Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 
513–15 (2011).  
 2. The United States is the leading incarcerator in the world. Highest to 
Lowest - Prison Population Total, INT’L CTR. PRISON STUD., http://www 
.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_ 
taxonomy_tid=All (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (showing the world’s prison popu-
lation rates). Several aspects of our justice system, from incarcerating juvenile 
offenders to the severity of our penal system, are exceptional in the context of 
other countries with similar political economies. See Sharon Dolovich, Fore-
word: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 237–38 
(2009) (describing unique features of the U.S. criminal justice system that 
make it exceptional); Nicola Lacey, American Imprisonment in Comparative 
Perspective, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 102, 106 (examining “American ‘pe-
nal exceptionalism’” based upon political structures).  
 3. Beckett & Harris, supra note 1, at 509; Alexes Harris et al., Drawing 
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states struggle to close budget gaps produced by the untenable 
pressures of mass incarceration, economic sanctions are in-
creasing without much restraint.
4
 Many states are expanding 
the types of offenses that trigger economic fines as the principle 
punishment.
5
 At the same time, economic sanctions increasing-
ly finance critical aspects of the criminal justice system.
6
  
This trend is developing in contrast to the reality that most 
offenders cannot pay economic sanctions in full. The average 
formerly incarcerated male lives at or below the poverty line in 
the United States.
7
 While courts are constitutionally required 
to consider an individual’s ability to pay economic sanctions,
8
 
evidence demonstrates that they regularly do not.
9
 As a result, 
many offenders face unmanageable criminal justice debt upon 
release into the community.
10
 Moreover, aggressive collection 
practices and profit-oriented collection services make the out-
come of economic sanctions, i.e., criminal justice debt, a road-
block to successful reintegration to society.
11
  
When the American Law Institute (ALI) set out to revise 
and update the Model Penal Code,
12
 one of the major undertak-
ings of the project was re-envisioning the use of economic sanc-
tions as punishment. Since 2001 the ALI Reporters have con-
sidered and drafted several versions of the revised Code to 
create an approach to economic sanctions that balances oft-
competing perspectives on this method of punishment.
13
 These 
drafts tried to find the right compromise between allowing 
 
Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary 
United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1770 (2010) (“[M]onetary sanctions are 
now a common supplement to confinement and criminal justice supervision.”).  
 4. See infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part I.  
 6. Id.  
 7. See 2014 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/14poverty.cfm (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (a single 
individual lives at the poverty line in the United States if he or she earns 
$11,670 per year); see infra notes 93–94.   
 8. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 698–69 (1983). 
 9. See infra notes 113–123 and accompanying text.  
 10. See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 7–10 (2010); infra Part II. 
 11. See BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 24–
29. For more discussion, see infra Part II.  
 12. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 
with amendments May 19, 2014).  
 13. Professor Kevin Reitz has worked as the Model Penal Code: Sentenc-
ing Reporter since 2001. He was joined by Cecelia Klingele as Associate Re-
porter in 2012. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Lance Liebman, Foreword, 
Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014).  
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courts to use economic sanctions as an alternative method of 
punishment and setting realistic limits on the use of economic 
sanctions to promote an offender’s reintegration into society.
14
  
The current version of the revised Code takes pivotal steps 
to improve economic sanctions. First, it prohibits costs, assess-
ments, and other “user fees” that require offenders to pay for 
services in the criminal justice system.
15
 Second, in the event 
that such assessments are not eliminated, the revised Code 
clarifies the hierarchy of payment, prioritizing restitution over 
any other court-imposed costs or fees.
16
 Finally, it caps econom-
ic sanctions based upon a “reasonable financial subsistence” 
standard.
17
 This standard limits the total amount of economic 
sanctions that a court can impose on the individual based upon 
the amount required to maintain reasonable necessities for the 
individual and his or her family.
18
 These measures will do much 
to address the dangers of unfettered economic sanctions in the 
states, from the appearance of a conflict of interest in the court 
system to the unconstitutional incarceration of offenders for 
their failure to pay criminal justice debt.
19
  
Though these measures provide critical improvements, the 
revised Code avoids tackling one of the key problems with eco-
nomic sanctions in the states: defining ability-to-pay determi-
nations. Courts are constitutionally required to assess whether 
an individual can pay court-imposed debts.
20
 Courts vary in 
their interpretation of this mandate, with some courts making 
the determination before or after the imposition of fines, and 
some measuring the individual’s ability to pay at the time of 
sentencing or in the future, based on predicted earning power.
21
 
 
 14. See Kevin Reitz, Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders: Recommenda-
tions of the Model Penal Code (Second), 99 MINN. L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2015) 
(“The widespread practice in American law is to impose economic penalties 
with uncertain chances of collection and with insufficient concern for their 
long-term impact on offender reintegration and public safety.”).  
 15. User fees are “financial obligations imposed not for any traditional 
criminal justice purpose such as punishment, deterrence, or rehabilitation but 
rather to fund tight state budgets.” BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.  The 
Code recommends eliminating such costs. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 
§ 6.04D (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014). For further discussion, see infra Part 
III. 
 16. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(10) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014); see infra Part III.  
 17. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 
3, 2014). 
 18. Id. § 6.04(B).  
 19. See infra Part III.  
 20. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–70 (1983).  
 21. See infra Part II.  
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The revised Code addresses this issue by establishing the “rea-
sonable financial subsistence” standard and requiring an as-
sessment prior to the imposition of cumulative fees and fines. It 
does not, however, define the “reasonable subsistence” standard 
with specificity; rather, the Code leaves this measure to the 
discretion of judges and legislatures for clarification.
22
 Such a 
step is in line with the drafters’ desire to promote different 
practices amongst the states,
23
 but it leaves unanswered a 
question that courts consistently struggle to address.
24
  
This Article makes two interventions in relation to the 
Code’s efforts to improve economic sanctions. First, it proposes 
measures that can build on the important improvements cap-
tured in the revised Code. These measures include reforms to 
increase the amount of information available to courts and the 
public relating to the accumulation of criminal justice debt and 
the creation of monitoring agencies to provide individuals with-
in the justice system with more information about the economic 
sanctions imposed upon them. Second, this Article observes 
how rational use of economic sanctions as a method of punish-
ment in the United States is inextricably intertwined with two 
trends in justice reform: the budget crisis in state court sys-
tems
25
 and the pressures of budget-cut criminal justice reform.
26
 
 
 22. See infra Part III.  
 23. The states are considered experimental grounds in sentencing reform, 
and accordingly we expect some variety in their methods and use of punish-
ment. At the same time, since the 1970s there has been a focused effort to re-
duce unwarranted disparities in sentencing between different judges in the 
same jurisdiction and to guide unfettered discretion. This Article argues that 
the disparities in use of and approach to economic sanctions require further 
guidance regarding discretion beyond that provided by the revised Model Pe-
nal Code. See infra Part IV.A.  
 24. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU Fund of Mich. et al. in Support 
of Joseph Bailey, at 16, People v. Bailey, 2014 WL 310203 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 
28, 2014) (No. 311682) (“Although pay-or-stay sentences are routine in some 
courts in Michigan, there is a troubling lack of consistency in the imposition of 
these sentences.”); ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW 
DEBTORS’ PRISONS 17–80 (2010) (describing limited ability-to-pay analyses 
conducted in Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Georgia, and Washington). For fur-
ther discussion, see infra Section III.  
 25. The economic downturn in 2008 resulted in a significant decrease in 
funding to state courts. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Cutbacks in California Court 
System Produce Long Lines, Short Tempers, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2014), http:// 
www.latimes.com/local/la-me-court-cuts-20140511-story.html (pointing to the 
economic downturn as the cause of court underfunding). This development 
spread to the federal judiciary with sequestration. Adam Liptak, Budget Cuts 
Imperil Federal Court System, Roberts Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2013), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/01/us/politics/budget-cuts-imperil-court-system 
-chief-justice-says.html. As a result, state courts have sought funding from al-
ternative sources to address this crisis. E.g., Dolan, supra (explaining that 
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These trends perversely disincentivize courts and legislatures 
from reining in the severity of economic sanctions.
27
 Though the 
revised Code discourages the use of economic sanction proceeds 
to support court operations,
28
 courts may continue to rely on 
revenue from monetary sanctions to supplement their budgets 
unless legislatures revitalize court funding.
29
 At the same time, 
cost-effectiveness increasingly justifies and motivates criminal 
justice reforms.
30
 This cost-cutting environment drives states to 
continue transferring justice system costs to offenders.
31
 These 
trends may exist in tension with the Model Penal Code’s efforts 
to create a revised approach to economic sanctions. They will 
also affect the revised Code’s ability to successfully improve the 
imposition of economic sanctions in the long-term.
32
  
Though economic sanctions are an appealing sentencing 
option given the economic and fiscal pressures mass incarcera-
tion places on the American justice system, this Article does not 
suggest that the expansion of economic sanctions is the answer 
to reducing mass incarceration. Economic sanctions can and do 
pull a broad scope of individuals into the justice system who 
may not need to be there at all.
33
 Rather, this Article focuses on 
how to improve the use of economic sanctions whether it is used 
as an alternative to incarceration, a supplement to incarcera-
tion, or a standalone sanction.   
 
Kings County Superior Court held a garage sale to raise money). As part of 
that response, courts are more aggressively collecting debts from criminal of-
fenders. See infra Part I.  
 26. States and the federal government have implemented reforms to re-
duce reliance on incarceration as a cost-saving measure. See infra Part I. Such 
reforms show great potential in reducing overincarceration in the United 
States, but they also present perils to the extent that reforms that save money 
do not necessarily improve the justice system. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Against 
Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 210–22 (2013); Mary D. Fan, Beyond 
Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 581, 
630–33 (2012); Marie Gottschalk, Cell Blocks & Red Ink: Mass Incarceration, 
the Great Recession & Penal Reform, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 62, 63, 67–
69.  
 27. See infra Part III.  
 28. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(D) (Tentative Draft No. 
3, 2014).  
 29. See infra Part IV.  
 30. See Eaglin, supra note 26, at 202; Fan, supra note 26, at 70; Jessica 
M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, at 26 (forthcoming 2015); see infra notes 
201–202 and accompanying text.  
 31. See infra notes 59–70 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra Part IV. 
 33. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).  
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This Article unfolds in four parts. Part I describes the rise 
of economic sanctions in recent decades. Part II demonstrates 
the troubling outcome of this development: the associated rise 
of criminal justice debt. It also chronicles the variety of ap-
proaches courts take in determining whether an individual has 
the ability to pay economic sanctions. Part III provides an over-
view of the Model Penal Code’s improvements to economic 
sanctions, with a particular emphasis on the new “reasonable 
financial subsistence” standard. Part IV proposes additional 
measures to supplement the reforms embodied in the revised 
Model Penal Code. It also discusses how funding shortages in 
the courts and budget-cut criminal justice reform may prevent 
efforts to improve economic sanctions in the states. The Article 
then concludes.  
I.  THE EXPANSION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS   
Between 1972 and 2010, the U.S. prison population in-
creased exponentially, from fewer than 200,000 prisoners to 
more than 1.6 million.
34
 Including jails, the United States now 
incarcerates approximately 2.3 million people on any given 
day.
35
 By 2012, one in 108 American adults was incarcerated.
36
 
During these decades, the contours of American exceptionalism 
expanded as the United States acquired the distinction of lead-
ing incarcerator in the world.
37
 Today, despite minor decreases 
in recent years,
38
 the current rate of incarceration remains far 
 
 34. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS 1925–81 tbl.1 (1982), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p2581.pdf (showing 196,092 
sentenced prisoners in 1972); E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 2 tbl.1 (2014). The U.S. rate of incarcera-
tion grew exponentially as well. In 1972, the United States incarcerated 161 
residents per 100,000 in the population. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 33 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014). By 2012, the United 
States incarcerated 707 per 100,000, or more than four times the rate in 1972. 
Id.   
 35. There are approximately 1.55 million individuals incarcerated in state 
and federal prisons in the United States. CARSON, supra note 34, at 1. Addi-
tionally, there are more than 730,000 individuals incarcerated in local jails 
across the country. TODD D. MINTON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2013 - STATISTICAL TABLES 1 
(2014).  
 36. OLIVER ROEDER, ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED 
THE CRIME DECLINE? PRISON, POLICING, AND OTHER THEORIES 20 (forthcom-
ing 2015).  
 37. INT’L CTR. PRISON STUD., supra note 2 (showing the world’s prison 
population rates). 
 38. CARSON, supra note 34, at 1.  
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outsized in comparison to the average pre-1980s rate, and to 
the rates of other countries with similar political and economic 
structures.
39
  
Other aspects of the criminal justice system expanded 
along with the increasing prison population. In 2012, about 4.8 
million offenders were serving sentences of probation or parole 
in the United States.
40
 Not unlike incarceration, the United 
States places individuals on probation and parole at a rate far 
outsized in comparison to other democratic countries around 
the world.
41
 In other words, “mass incarceration” and “mass su-
pervision” developed in tandem in the United States.
42
  
These phenomena created untenable pressures on the 
criminal justice system. State and federal correctional costs 
now exceed $80 billion per year.
43
 After adding judicial, legal, 
and police costs, this amount climbs to $260 billion annually.
44
 
Since the Great Recession, budget constraints in the states 
have resulted in funding cuts to court systems.
45
 As a result, 
ever-growing offender populations cycle through cash-strapped 
justice systems.  
 
 39. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 33 & n.1; THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1 (2014), available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_Fact_
sheet.pdf. Compare Lacey, supra note 2, at 108 (asserting that U.S. penal dis-
parity must be examined by “unraveling longer-term institutional dynamics”), 
with INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, supra note 2 (displaying U.S. penal dis-
parity against other countries’ prison populations).  
 40. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 3 
(2012).  
 41. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.03, reporters’ note, at e (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 3, 2014) (acknowledging that the rates of probation and 
postrelease supervision in the United States are, by international standards, 
as exceptional as U.S. incarceration rates).  
 42. See id. (“Arguably, the U.S. engages in ‘mass probation’ or ‘mass su-
pervision’ . . . on a par with the nation’s ‘mass imprisonment’ or ‘mass incar-
ceration.’”); Michelle S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Community Super-
vision in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 35 LAW & POL’Y 51, 66 (2013) 
(demonstrating a correlation between larger increases in probation rates and 
larger increases in incarceration rates between the 1980s and 2000s). 
 43. INIMAI CHETTIAR ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REFORMING 
FUNDING TO REDUCE MASS INCARCERATION 9 (2013).  
 44. Id.   
 45. See DANIEL J. HALL, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, RESHAPING THE 
FACE OF JUSTICE: THE ECONOMIC TSUNAMI CONTINUES 1 (asserting that “[t]he 
Great Recession continues to leave state courts reeling,” as state court admin-
istrators reported that twenty-nine states had budget decreases in fiscal year 
2011, thirty-five state courts reported deficits in 2010, and in 2009 thirty-three 
state courts reported deficits.).  
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Within this context, economic sanctions are emerging as an 
understudied but oft-used method of punishment.
46
 “Economic 
sanctions” broadly refer to any legal financial obligations, in-
cluding restitution, fines, and fees. Restitution compensates a 
victim for harm stemming from criminal wrongdoing.
47
 “Fines” 
are sanctions imposed on an offender to punish him or her for 
criminal wrongdoing.
48
 The imposition of fines is relatively rare 
in the United States.
49
 Fees, on the other hand, have no relation 
to the criminal offense; rather, this type of economic sanction is 
imposed on the offender to offset costs in the criminal justice 
system.
50
  
During the era of mass incarceration, the prevalence of res-
titution orders increased. At the federal level, Congress steadily 
expanded restitution starting in 1990.
51
 By 1996, it enacted leg-
islation requiring restitution for crimes of violence and proper-
ty offenses.
52
 Similar legislative trends developed in the states. 
By 2004, one-third of states required courts to order restitution 
to victims in cases involving certain types of crimes.
53
 Restitu-
tion repayment has a utilitarian effect. Repayment of this eco-
 
 46. While “the widespread use and potential harms of economic sanctions 
have received minimal attention in the academic literature,” Beth A. Colgan, 
Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 284 (2014), specif-
ic policy organizations, academics, and practitioners are raising awareness 
about this issue. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1776; Wayne A. Logan 
& Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175; 
ACLU, supra note 24, at 11 (urging better data collection by jurisdictions to 
better study economic sanctions and debt collection practices); BANNON ET AL.,  
supra note 10. Economic sanctions represent a trend that expands beyond just 
state governments. As more and more government functions in the criminal 
justice system are privatized, the fees and fines associated with the criminal 
justice system increase. See, e.g., ACLU supra note 24, at 59–61. Though this 
issue is outside the scope of this Article, the restrictions on imposition of eco-
nomic sanctions may have some effect in the privatized context as well.  
 47. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 4. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Pat O’Malley, Politicizing the Case for Fines, 10 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 547, 551 (2011) (“[M]ost countries outside the 
United States rely heavily on fines and have done so for many decades.”).  
 50. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 12.  
 51. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2509, 104 Stat. 
4789, 4863 (1990) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)) (broadening 
scope of offenses that qualify for restitution to include defendant’s conduct in a 
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of conduct).  
 52. See Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, § 204, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3663(a)).  
 53. Restitution, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, http://www 
.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-
victims/restitution (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).  
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nomic sanction is proven to decrease recidivism amongst of-
fenders.
54
 Despite this reality, many states do not prioritize re-
payment of this sanction above other legal financial obliga-
tions.
55
   
Due to the pressures on justice systems created by mass 
incarceration, some states are shifting toward fines-based pun-
ishment as a viable alternative to incarceration for low-level of-
fenses. Decriminalization of certain low-level offenses has 
grown in popularity in recent years. For example, in 2010, the 
American Bar Association Commission on Homelessness and 
Poverty urged jurisdictions “to undertake a comprehensive re-
view of the misdemeanor provisions of their criminal laws, and, 
where appropriate, to allow the imposition of civil fines or 
nonmonetary civil remedies instead of criminal sanctions.”
56
 
Many states responded by reclassifying offenses as 
“nonjailable” or “fines-only.”
57
  
The decriminalization of possession of marijuana serves as 
an excellent example of how states reclassifying offenses leads 
to the creation of more economic sanctions in the justice sys-
tem. Decriminalization means “the reduction or elimination of 
traditional criminal penalties for conduct that remains prohib-
ited.”
58
 This is distinguished from legalization, which removes 
conduct from criminal regulation entirely.
59
 Two states—
 
 54. Id.  
 55. All states and the federal government prioritize child support over 
restitution. DOUGLAS N. EVANS, JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
THE DEBT PENALTY: EXPOSING THE FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO OFFENDER 
REINTEGRATION 6, 8 (2014). In some states, legal fees and fines are also priori-
tized over restitution. Id. 
 56. AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION COMM’N ON 
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 16, 19 
(2009).  
 57. For example, North Carolina revised its misdemeanor grid to trans-
form many misdemeanor offenses into fine-only offenses while reclassifying 
certain offenses to qualify for that designation. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.23(d) (2013) (revising the Code in 2013 to provide that “[u]nless other-
wise provided for a specific offense, the judgment for a person convicted of a 
Class 3 misdemeanor who has no more than three prior convictions shall con-
sist only of a fine”); 7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B.14 (2013) (reclassifying some 
misdemeanors from Class 2 to Class 3 offenses); see also SPAGENBURG 
PROJECT, CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LAW & SOC’Y AT GEORGE MASON UNIV., AN 
UPDATE ON STATE EFFORTS IN MISDEMEANOR RECLASSIFICATION, PENALTY 
REDUCTION AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, at i (2010) (recognizing “signifi-
cant movement” toward states reclassifying low level misdemeanors into 
charges that do not carry the possibility of confinement).  
 58. Natapoff, supra note 33, at 11.  
 59. Id. at 12 (decriminalization “merely reduces and/or alters the penal-
ties for engaging in . . . impermissible behavior” as opposed to legalization 
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Colorado and Washington—legalized marijuana in 2012.
60
 By 
2014, thirty-four states plus the District of Columbia imple-
mented legislation to legalize its medicinal use or decriminalize 
the substance in part (for medical use) or in full (for minor of-
fenses).
61
 Many of these states have only “partially” decriminal-
ized possession,
62
 meaning the offense is reclassified as a 
nonjailable misdemeanor. In other words, these offenses now 
result in the imposition of fines for offenders, as opposed to in-
carceration. This trend suggests that further experimentation 
with marijuana decriminalization will expand the imposition of 
economic sanctions as a primary method of punishment.
63
  
The most troubling increase in economic sanctions occurred 
in relation to “user fees.” Fees emerged in the 1970s to supple-
ment criminal justice systems,
64
 and since the 1990s have in-
creased in scope.
65
 Individuals are increasingly expected to pay 
for various aspects of their adjudication in the criminal justice 
 
where the behavior is not prohibited).  
 60. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (amended 2012); WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 69.50.363, 69.50.101(t)–(y) (codifying Initiative Measure No. 502, approved 
Nov. 6, 2012). 
 61. David Firestone, Let States Decide on Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 
2014, at SR.10; see State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 29. 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state 
-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (“A total of 23 states, the District of Columbia 
and Guam now allow for comprehensive public medical marijuana and canna-
bis programs.”).  
 62. See State Laws with Alternatives to Incarceration for Marijuana Pos-
session, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/ 
State-Decrim-Chart.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). States that have partially 
decriminalized possession are Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, and New York. See id. 
 63. Cf. Editorial, Repeal Prohibition, Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2014, at 
SR.1 (discussing the “rapidly growing movement among the states to reform 
marijuana laws”).  
 64. O’Malley, supra note 49, at 551.  
 65. Alan Rosenthal & Marsha Weissman, Sentencing for Dollars: The Fi-
nancial Consequences of a Criminal Conviction 13 (Feb. 1, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Center for Community Alternatives Justice 
Strategies) (asserting that “the use of financial penalties has flourished since 
the early 1990’s”); see also Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political 
Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WILLIAM & 
MARY L. REV. 2045, 2054 (2006) (asserting that application fee laws have 
gained popularity over the past decade, increasing by 300% from 1994 to 
2004); see also, e.g., REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE 
HIDDEN COSTS OF FLORIDA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES 5 (2010), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/FloridaF&F.pdf 
(“From 1996 through 2007, the Florida Legislature created or authorized more 
than 20 new categories of legal financial obligations (‘LFOs’) – surcharges, 
fees, and other monetary obligations – related to criminal cases and viola-
tions.”).  
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system. Such fees include public defender fees,
66
 daily jail fees,
67
 
court administration fees,
68
 DNA database costs,
69
 drug testing 
costs,
70
 probation supervision fees,
71
 and other fees. These fees 
 
 66. See Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying the Price, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
transcript/transcript.php?storyId=312158516 (explaining the results of a na-
tionwide survey conducted by NPR with help from NYU’s Brennan Center for 
Justice and the National Center for State Courts, discovering that at least for-
ty-three states and the District of Columbia allow for a defendant to be billed 
for a public defender); see also Wright & Logan, supra note 65, at 2046, 2052 
(claiming that since the early 1990s, there has been a rise in the number of 
states authorizing or compelling judges to impose fees on indigent criminal 
defendants who seek appointed counsel). 
 67. See Shapiro, supra note 66 (reporting that forty-one states may charge 
inmates room and board for jail and prison stays); see e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-6-
22(a)(1)–(3) (2011) (requiring defendants in misdemeanor cases to pay for 
housing, maintenance, and medical costs in addition to a jail incarceration fee 
of up to $20 per day, which may be remitted upon a showing of hardship); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804.01 (2010) (imposing a fee, based on the costs of 
incarceration and the person’s ability to pay, for those convicted of a misde-
meanor); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.1c(a), 1203.1m(a) (2014) (authorizing 
courts to charge a fee for defendants who must serve a period of confinement 
in jail as a term of probation or a conditional sentence and to require defend-
ants to pay the reasonable cost of incarceration in state prison after making a 
determination of their ability to pay); FLA. STAT. § 951.033(2)–(3) (2014) (au-
thorizing detention facilities to determine the financial status of prisoners and 
require prisoners to “pay for all or a fair portion of daily subsistence costs”); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-4(d) (2014) (requiring that “[a]n amount determined to 
be the cost of the inmate’s keep and confinement” be deducted from the earn-
ings of inmates participating in work-release programs); LA. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 890.2(A)–(B) (2014) (after making a determination of a de-
fendant’s ability to pay, courts may impose an additional fine equal to the ex-
pected costs to the state of imprisonment); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 801.83(1)(a) 
(2009) (authorizing counties to seek reimbursement of up to $60 per day of im-
prisonment for the entire period the person was confined, including any period 
of pretrial); N.Y. CORRECTION LAW § 189.2 (Consol. 2014) (imposing a maxi-
mum $1 per week incarceration fee for each week of confinement); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 7A-313 (2014) (providing that persons lawfully confined in jail await-
ing trial are liable to pay the country or municipality maintaining the jail $10 
for every 24 hours of confinement the unless the case has been dismissed). 
 68. See, e.g., Other Statutory Provisions, CT. COSTS, FEES & FINES FOR 
MUN. CTS. (Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Austin, Tex.), 2009, at 3, availa-
ble at http://www.texasahead.org/lga/96-864.pdf; Fines, Fees, Costs, and Rates, 
MICHIGAN CTS., http://courts.mi.gov/administration/admin/pages/fines,-fees, 
-costs,-and-rates.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
 69. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.35(1)(a)(v) (McKinney 2015) (requiring 
defendants convicted of an offense under N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995(7) (McKinney 
2015) to pay a $50 DNA databank fee); see also Paris Achen, ACLU Finds 
Clark County Courts Set Excessive Fines on Felons, COLUMBIAN, Feb. 24, 2014, 
available at http://www.columbian.com/news/2014/feb/24/aclu-finds-clark 
-county-courts-set-excessive-fines (finding that Washington state requires 
judges to impose a $100 DNA database fee). 
 70. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 948.034(1)(a)4 (requiring any person who resides 
in a community residential drug punishment center to submit to routine drug 
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increasingly represent normal assessments in the United 
States. Today, at least forty-three states and the District of Co-
lumbia may charge defendants a public defender fee.
72
 In forty-
one states, inmates may be charged for room and board during 
a jail stay.
73
 In forty-four states, individuals may be billed for 
probation and parole supervision.
74
 Interestingly, fees have in-
creased in part to offset diminishing funding for alternatives to 
incarceration.
75
 In all states except Hawaii and the District of 
Columbia, persons are charged for electronic monitoring devic-
es used for court supervision.
76
  
Portions of economic sanctions collected may also support 
rehabilitative services offered for other offenders. For example, 
 
testing and bear the costs of such testing); see also Rosenthal & Weissman, 
supra note 65, at 16 (asserting that many counties have enacted local legisla-
tion authorizing the collection of fees for “services” such as drug testing); see 
also e.g., Fines and Fees, S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., https://www.schr.org/ 
our-work/debtors-prisons (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (finding that courts in 
Georgia are assessing more fees, including the cost of drug tests, to help meet 
costs of the criminal justice system). 
 71. See Joseph Shapiro, Measures Aimed At Keeping People Out of Jail 
Punish the Poor, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 24, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www 
.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=314866421 (finding that 
in at least forty-four states offenders can be billed for their own probation and 
parole supervision); see e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-2(a) (requiring defendants to 
pay a $40 per month fee toward the cost of supervision for parole or proba-
tion); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.1b(a), 1203.1e(a)–(b) (mandating that a de-
fendant pay all or a portion of the reasonable cost of probation or parole su-
pervision after a determination of a defendant’s ability to pay); FLA. STAT. 
§ 948.09(1)(a) (requiring any person on parole or probation to pay the total 
sum equal to the amount of court-imposed supervision time); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 42-8-34(d)(1) (imposing a $23 per month probation fee in addition to a one-
time $50 fee for defendants convicted of a felony); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 257-c 
(McKinney 2015) (imposing a $30 per month fee for DWI-related probation su-
pervision); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.690.3 (2014) (allowing the board to require 
payment of a fee up to $60 per month for probation supervision); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-1343(cl) (requiring defendants to pay a $40 monthly fee for super-
vised probation unless exempted by the court); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2951.021(A)(1) (2014) (allowing courts to impose a monthly probation fee); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11.1102(c) (2014) (mandating a monthly fee for parole 
and probation). 
 72. Shapiro, supra note 71. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. See id. 
 76. Id.; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-35(a)(14) (authorizing the Georgia 
Department of Corrections to assess and collect fees from probationers for 
electronic surveillance or global positioning satellite system monitoring); Pre-
trial Services, ALACHUACOUNTY.US, http://www.alachuacounty.us/Depts/ 
CourtServices/Pages/PretrialServices.aspx (noting that defendants in Alachua 
County, Florida “supervised on electronic monitoring pay nominal fees to de-
fray program costs”). 
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California’s recently adopted Proposition 47 converts sentences 
for low-level nonviolent crimes such as drug possession and 
petty theft from felonies to misdemeanors for most offenders.
77
 
The anticipated financial savings from this reform are explicit-
ly earmarked: 25% of the savings will be directed to school pro-
grams designed to prevent crime; 10% will be directed to 
“trauma recovery services for crime victims”; and 65% will be 
directed to “mental health and substance abuse treatment pro-
grams to reduce recidivism of people in the justice system.”
78
 
Fees and fines may be used to support victim-related pro-
gramming as well.
79
  
The use of economic sanctions is largely unfettered. Judges 
enjoy a great deal of discretion when imposing economic sanc-
tions.
80
 Very little guidance exists on how or when to use this 
sanction.
81
 As economic sanctions are becoming more common, 
they may be more severe and more onerous as well.
82
 Though 
many fees and fines fall within the judge’s discretion to impose, 
states have increasingly created mandatory economic sanctions 
by statute. For example, the Florida legislature increased the 
mandatory fine for solicitation of prostitution from $500 to 
$5,000 in 2013.
83
 In Pennsylvania, the legislature created a 
mandatory minimum fine of $75,000 for misdemeanor theft.
84
 
Washington law requires courts to conduct a victim “penalty 
 
 77. Specifically, this proposition requires misdemeanor sentences for two 
types of “wobbler” offenses: drug possession offenses, and petty theft, stolen 
property and forging/writing bad checks where the amount is $950 or less, un-
less the offender was previously convicted of rape, murder, child molestation 
and/or is a registered sex offender. See Proposition 47: Criminal Sentences, 
Misdemeanor Penalties, Initiative Statute, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION 
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2014: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 34 (2014), 
available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/complete-vig.pdf#page= 
70.  
 78. Id. at 76. 
 79. Id.; see also Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanc-
tions: Considering the Victim, the Offender and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 
1800 (2015).  
 80. See Ruback, supra note 79, at 1787–05. 
 81. See id.; see also id. at 1810. 
 82. See id. at 1828 (noting that a Human Rights Watch report found “that 
courts do little to determine whether offenders are actually able to pay their 
fines and fees”). 
 83. Children and Minors – Sexual Exploitation – Florida Safe Harbor Act, 
ch. 2012-105, § 769.07, 2012 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. (West); see FLA. STAT. 
§ 796.07(6) (2014).  
 84. Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act, ch. 4, 
§ 1518(b)(2)(i)(A), 2004 Pa. Laws 75, invalidated by Commonwealth v. Eisen-
berg, 98 A.3d 1268 (Pa. 2014).  
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assessment” every time an individual is convicted of a crime.
85
 
Even in “victimless” crimes, the court must impose these fines, 
amounting to $500 per felony and $250 per misdemeanor, in 
addition to any other required fees and fines.
86
 These laws 
demonstrate how economic sanctions are expanding without 
check from the legislature; indeed, the legislatures are attempt-
ing to eliminate judicial discretion in some instances.  
II.  INABILITY TO PAY AND THE RISE OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE DEBT   
The rise of economic sanctions is disconnected from the re-
ality of incarceration—specifically, that the majority of offend-
ers are unable to pay the fees and fines imposed by the courts 
in accordance with legislation. As a result, more individuals 
bear the burden of criminal justice debt and more courts bear 
the burden of trying to collect unpaid debts.  
Most offenders lack the resources to pay growing court-
imposed fees and fines. Before incarceration, most offenders re-
quire assistance in obtaining legal counsel.
87
 Upon release, em-
ployment opportunities for ex-offenders are bleak.
88
 Studies 
demonstrate that the likelihood of receiving a callback from a 
job application declines by fifty percent where the individual 
 
 85. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035(1) (2014). 
 86. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035(1)(a). For a comprehensive summary of 
the breadth and consequences of contemporary economic sanctions, see 
Colgan, supra note 46, at 284–95. 
 87. By 1996, almost seventy-five percent of state prisoners received pub-
licly provided legal counsel of convictions leading to incarceration. BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE (1996), available at http://www 
.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf. 
 88. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 233 (collecting studies 
demonstrating that “roughly half [of ex-prisoners] remain jobless up to a year 
after their release”). This is partially on account of the social stigma of a crim-
inal record, which detrimentally affects offenders’ ability to obtain employ-
ment whether they have been incarcerated in prison or simply placed under 
correctional supervision. See Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & 
Social Inequality, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 14 (discussing an audit study 
that “offers clear evidence for the negative effects of criminal stigma”). Accord-
ingly, the opportunity for offenders captures a broader swath of individuals 
beyond just those sent to prison. Indeed, the Brennan Center calculates that 
nearly 70 million Americans, or approximately thirty percent of the adult pop-
ulation, have criminal records. See CHETTIAR ET AL., supra note 43, at 3 & 49 
n.5; see also MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L 
EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR 
REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 27 n.2 (2011), 
available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2011/65_Million_Need_Not_ 
Apply.pdf (estimating that 65 million adults have criminal records in the 
United States). 
2015] IMPROVING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1851 
 
has a criminal record.
89
 For African Americans and Latinos, 
this reality is particularly damaging to employment opportuni-
ties. Minorities without a criminal record are less likely than 
white applicants just released from prison to obtain employ-
ment.
90
 Criminal records significantly reduce the odds of a 
black or Hispanic applicant receiving a job offer. Indeed, the 
odds of a black applicant with a criminal record receiving a job 
are reduced by 57%.
91
 Even for those offenders who can obtain 
employment, serving time in prison or jail depresses annual 
earnings significantly.
92
 The average formerly incarcerated 
white male earns only approximately $12,094 per year.
93
 Black 
and Hispanic offenders earn less.
94
 The stigma of conviction 
makes employment, housing, and other basic necessities diffi-
cult to obtain.
95
 Again, these disadvantages are disproportion-
ately borne by African Americans and Latinos, who often face 
discrimination in accessing housing regardless of criminal rec-
ords. Adding criminal justice debt to the challenges an individ-
ual faces upon criminal conviction only further burdens the in-
 
 89. Western & Pettit, supra note 88 (discussing Devah Pager’s experi-
mental studies on job seekers with criminal records).  
 90. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECKS AND THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION’S CONVICTION RECORDS POLICY 196 (2012) (statement of Glenn 
E. Martin, Vice President, Development and Public Affairs, Director, David 
Rothenberg Center for Public Policy at the Fortune Society).  
 91. Id.  
 92. Studies show that serving time in either prison or jail reduces hourly 
wages for men by approximately 11%, annual employment by nine weeks and 
annual earnings by 40%. Id.  
 93. In 2008 dollars, the average formerly incarcerated white male earned 
an average income of $11,140. Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1776. Translating 
that into 2014 dollars, the average formerly incarcerated white male makes 
approximately $12,094. See Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: 
All Items, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
series/CPIAUCSL# (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (providing translating data for 
determining 2014 figure).  
 94. See Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1776 (finding that formerly incar-
cerated black men earn $8,012 per year in 2008 dollars, and formerly incar-
cerated Hispanic men earn $10,432 per year in 2008 dollars). In 2014 dollars, 
formerly incarcerated black men earn on average $8,698 per year and formerly 
incarcerated Hispanic men earn $11,325 per year. See Consumer Price Index, 
supra note 93 (providing translating data for determining 2014 figures). For 
more details on the disproportionate effect that incarceration plays on minori-
ties’ economic mobility and earning power, see Western & Pettit, supra note 
88, at 12–14.  
 95. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: 
Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 491–92 (2010) 
(documenting the denial of public housing based on criminal convictions); 
Western & Pettit, supra note 88 (documenting the stigmatizing effect of crimi-
nal convictions in employment). 
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dividual and his or her family.
96
 This debt also stands to exac-
erbate racial disparities that already exist in society.  
Despite offenders’ inability to pay, courts continue to im-
pose economic sanctions; as a result, the number of people ow-
ing court-imposed monetary sanctions continues to rise. In 
1991, 25% of individuals leaving prison owed fees; by 2004, that 
number increased to 66%.
97
 Today, it is estimated that as many 
as 80% to 85% of individuals leaving prison owe fees.
98
 By 2011, 
offenders owed more than $50 billion in criminal justice debt 
across the country.
99
  
Economic sanctions can prove debilitating to an offender. 
Failure to pay can generate late fees, interest, and additional 
collection fees.
100
 These additional costs exacerbate the severity 
of the already-onerous fees and fines imposed by the court. 
Nonpayment may lead to driver’s license suspension, wage 
garnishment, prolonged court supervision, arrest warrants, and 
incarceration.
101
 It also subjects individuals to aggressive collec-
tion tactics and “payment plan” fines that often result in in-
surmountable debt.
102
 Punishment for nonpayment affects more 
than just the individual who incurs the debt; it affects the lives 
of the family and friends who assist the individual upon reentry 
to a community.
103
  
Debilitating criminal justice debt is damaging for society at 
large as well. Debt collection consumes time public employees 
could spend doing traditional functions, thus increasing the 
cost of court operations. Moreover, the aggressive collection tac-
tics like wage and tax garnishment may deter individuals from 
obtaining traditional employment.
104
 For some, it may incentiv-
ize a turn toward underground economies and even criminal 
behavior.
105
 Recidivism comes at a high cost to society. Not only 
does it threaten public safety, but recidivism negates the in-
 
 96. See MITALI NAGRECHA & MARY FAINSOD KATZENSTEIN, CTR. FOR 
CMTY. ALTS., FIRST PERSON ACCOUNTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: WHEN 
ALL ELSE FAILS, FINING THE FAMILY 3 (2015), available at http:// 
communityalternatives.org/pdf/Criminal-Justice-Debt.pdf.  
 97. Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1769.   
 98. Shapiro, supra note 66.  
 99. EVANS, supra note 55, at 4. 
 100. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.  
 101. ACLU, supra note 24, at 5–9; BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 11.  
 102. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S 
“OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 14, 43, 55 (2014).  
 103. NAGRECHA & KATZENSTEIN, supra note 96, at 3.  
 104. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 27.  
 105. See id.  
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vestment that society already placed in punishing and rehabili-
tating an offender in the first instance.  
In fact, the additional cost municipalities pay to punish 
debtors may outweigh the amount recovered through collec-
tion.
106
 Enforcement measures, including incarceration, use sys-
tem resources, including the processing time spent by employ-
ees and possible processing through the jail system. These real 
costs may not be recouped by the collection of outstanding legal 
financial obligations. A 2011 study in Massachusetts concluded 
that an additional jail fee would increase taxpayer expense be-
cause of the resources required for successful implementa-
tion.
107
 In Rhode Island, a 2008 study demonstrated that incar-
cerating individuals for failure to pay debts in many instances 
resulted in the state spending more money on enforcement 
than the offenders owed in total court debt.
108
  
In theory, economic sanctions are limited by an offender’s 
“ability to pay.” In 1983, the Supreme Court held in Bearden v. 
Georgia that no individual may be incarcerated for their non-
willful failure to pay court-imposed financial obligations.
109
 
However, evidence suggests that courts routinely fail to ade-
quately assess a defendant’s ability to pay. In 2010, the Bren-
nan Center released a report on fees and fines imposed on de-
fendants in fifteen states.
110
 The report concludes: “Despite the 
fact that most criminal defendants are indigent, none of the fif-
teen examined states pay adequate attention to whether [these] 
individuals have the resources to pay criminal justice debt, ei-
ther when courts determine how much debt to impose or during 
the debt collection process.”
111
 A growing body of literature sup-
ports this assertion.
112
  
Moreover, states do not provide meaningful standards or 
methodologies for ability-to-pay determinations. For example, 
 
 106. See ROOPAL PATEL & MEGHNA PHILIP, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A TOOLKIT FOR ACTION 5–6 (2012).  
 107. Id. at 11.  
 108. Id. at 12.  
 109. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).  
 110. The Brennan Center studied practices and statutes in the fifteen 
states with the largest prison populations in 2010: California, Arizona, Texas, 
Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, Virginia, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and Missouri. BANNON ET AL., supra 
note 10, at 1, 6.  
 111. Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted).  
 112. See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 24; Harris et al., supra note 3; PATEL & 
PHILIP, supra note 106; Nate Rawlings, Welcome to Prison. Will You Be Paying 
Cash or Credit?, TIME (Aug. 21, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/08/21/ 
welcome-to-prison-will-you-be-paying-cash-or-credit.  
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there is no consensus amongst courts as to when or how to de-
termine ability to pay. Michigan requires courts to make abil-
ity-to-pay assessments according to a “manifest hardship” 
standard.
113
 However, courts do not make that assessment be-
fore imposing fees and fines; rather, courts only make that as-
sessment when the fee is enforced and the defendant challeng-
es that enforcement based upon his or her ability to pay.
114
 As a 
result, courts across the state routinely fail to make this as-
sessment.
115
 Even where courts do make this assessment, the 
defendant bears a “heavy burden of establishing his extraordi-
nary financial circumstances” and lower courts are granted 
broad discretion to decide how to assess ability to pay.
116
 As an-
other example, Ohio requires lower courts to consider the of-
fender’s financial resources and future ability to pay before im-
posing economic sanctions.
117
 A hearing on this issue is 
permissible, but not required. Nevertheless, an American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio investigation demonstrates 
that twenty-two percent of bookings in a rural county related to 
failure to pay fines.
118
 The report explains that individuals who 
failed to pay court fees and fines were summoned into court, 
assigned an arbitrary monthly payment plan without analysis 
of ability to pay, and later arrested based on failure to pay.
119
 A 
similar problem exists across the state.
120
 These states demon-
strate that “ability to pay” is a difficult and sometimes arbi-
trary assessment left to the lower courts to determine and de-
fine.  
The lack of guidance to courts results in vastly different 
approaches to the fundamental question of whether an offender 
 
 113. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 771.3(6)(b) (2015) (allowing courts to consider 
whether “payment of the amount due will impose a manifest hardship on the 
probationer or his or her immediate family”); Id. § 780.766(12) (allowing courts 
to consider whether payment of restitution “will impose a manifest hardship 
on the defendant or his or her immediate family”); People v. Jackson, 769 
N.W.2d 630, 633 (Mich. 2009) (“[O]nce an ability-to-pay assessment is trig-
gered, the court must consider whether the defendant remains indigent and 
whether repayment would cause manifest hardship.”) (overruling People v. 
Dunbar, 690 N.W.2d 476 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)).  
 114. Jackson, 769 N.W.2d at 645.  
 115. See Brief of Amici Curiae The ACLU Fund of Mich. et al. in Support of 
Joseph Bailey, supra note 24.  
 116. Jackson, 769 N.W.2d at 645.  
 117. OHIO REV. CODE § 2929.19(B)(5) (2015).  
 118. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OHIO, THE OUTSKIRTS OF HOPE: HOW 
OHIO DEBTORS’ PRISONS ARE RUINING LIVES AND COSTING COMMUNITIES 8 
(2013).  
 119. Id. at 8. 
 120. See id. at 9. 
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has the ability to pay. Some courts may look at the defendant’s 
present ability to pay,
121
 while others may make predictions 
about a defendant’s future ability to pay after a term of incar-
ceration.
122
 Still others do not consider ability to pay before the 
imposition of fines, but instead wait until an offender’s post-
imposition non-payment to decide whether the offender should 
be punished for failure to pay.
123
 As a result, the amount of eco-
nomic sanctions imposed on similar offenders may vary be-
tween and within jurisdictions.  
The current disparities in sentencing with economic sanc-
tions are intolerable. Since the 1970s, the distinction between 
“warranted” and “unwarranted” disparities has grown.
124
 “Un-
warranted” disparities are generally considered those dispari-
ties between offender sentences based upon race, geography, or 
the philosophical leanings of a particular judge. Inter-judge 
disparities, meaning disparities between judges within the 
same jurisdictions, are widely considered unwarranted.
125
 In 
the context of incarcerative punishments, policy shifted toward 
cabining unfettered discretion at sentencing. Limiting stand-
ards were introduced to guide discretion and eliminate “unwar-
ranted” disparities that existed amongst jurisdictions across 
the country.
126
 These principles attempted to strike a balance 
 
 121. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 771.3(6)(b), 780.766(12) (2014). 
 122. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.070 (2014) (“[W]henever any judge 
. . . .shall sentence any person to pay any fine and costs . . . no commitment or 
imprisonment of the defendant shall be made for failure to pay such fine or 
costs.”). As of early 2015, a group of policy organizations planned to introduce 
legislation referred to as the Prioritizing Restitution and Successful Reentry 
Act of 2015. This bill would reform Washington State courts to “determine 
that the offender has the current ability to pay the installment amount and 
satisfy his or her basic living expenses as defined by RCW 10.101.010.” Pov-
erty Action Network, Columbia Legal Servs. & ACLU of Wash., Prioritizing 
Restitution and Successful Reentry Act of 2015, at 10 (on file with author). 
This new provision illustrates that the vagueness of the current law results in 
alternative temporal analyses of ability to pay. See id.  
 123. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 7-504(a) (2014) (“A de-
fendant who is unable to pay a fine ordered by a court may apply to the court 
for a reduction of the fine.”).  
 124. Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State 
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 431 (2000) (noting the broad 
and bipartisan consensus that emerged in the 1970s amongst lawmakers that 
discretion in sentencing should be regulated to reduce disparities in sentenc-
ing).  
 125. Ryan W. Scott, The Effects of Booker on Inter-Judge Sentencing Dis-
parity, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 104, 104 (2009) (“Not all forms of disparity in sen-
tencing are a cause for concern, but inter-judge disparity is widely recognized 
as unwarranted.” (citation omitted)).  
 126. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT 
ORDER 69–85 (1973). 
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between individualized justice and equality on one hand, and 
objectivity and consistency in the law on the other.
127
 While 
states and the federal system adopted a variety of measures to 
infuse these principles in sentencing for incarceration,
128
 few ju-
risdictions took any measures to meaningfully guide discretion 
in the context of economic sanctions.
129
 The variety of approach-
es to using economic sanctions and the punitiveness of debt col-
lection demonstrate the need for principles to guide the discre-
tion of judges and legislatures who impose growing fees and 
fines on individual offenders.   
III.  REINVIGORATING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
THROUGH THE MODEL PENAL CODE   
The revised Model Penal Code strives to provide the guid-
ing principles and measures needed to improve the use of eco-
nomic sanctions in the United States. The ALI seeks to do this 
in three ways.  
First, it recommends that states eliminate user fees that 
treat offenders as a “special class of taxpayers” required to pay 
for underfunded criminal justice programs and operations.
130
 
Specifically, the revised Code states that  
  No convicted offender . . . shall be held responsible for the pay-
ment of costs, fees, and assessments. 
Costs, fees, and assessments . . . include financial obligations imposed 
by law-enforcement agencies, public-defender agencies, courts, correc-
tions departments, and corrections providers to defray expenses asso-
ciated with the investigation and prosecution of the offender or cor-
rectional services provided to the offender.
131
 
These user fees are some of the most offensive drivers of 
criminal justice debt because they do not further any of the 
traditional purposes of punishment.
132
 Rather, these debts at-
 
 127. Id. at 103–05, 111–15. 
 128. States adopted several measures to address unwarranted disparities 
in sentencing. Primarily, they responded by creating sentencing commissions, 
creating guidelines, and increasing appellate review of sentencing decisions. 
See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and 
the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 69–
70 (1999); Cf. FRANKEL, supra note 126, at 103–24.  
 129. See Logan & Wright, supra note 46, at 1215–25 (proposing an LFO 
“commission” similar to those existing in most states that currently study, 
monitor and issue recommendations on incarceration-based sentencing poli-
cies). 
 130. Reitz, supra note 14, at 1757. 
 131. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04D (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014). 
 132. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 (“Unlike fines, whose purpose is to 
punish, and restitution, whose purpose is to compensate victims, user fees are 
2015] IMPROVING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1857 
 
tend to budget constraints in the justice system.
133
 Elimination 
of such economic sanctions will reduce the appearance of prob-
lematic conflicts of interest in judicial enforcement of criminal 
justice debt collection.
134
 Where the courts are not forced to col-
lect economic sanctions designed exclusively to keep the court-
house doors open, there is less opportunity to question whether 
judges impose fines simply to sustain the court. Additionally, 
this provision will promote the use of economic sanctions as an 
alternative method of punishment. By confining sanctions such 
that they must further one of the purposes of punishment, this 
provision logically improves economic sanctions by allowing 
courts to use them as an exclusive method of punishment.   
Second, the revised Code prioritizes economic sanctions for 
collection purposes. Currently, states vary in whether restitu-
tion is the first-order item for collection.
135
 Under proposed sec-
tion 6.04(10), offender payments apply to victim restitution 
first.
136
 Moreover, the Code prohibits the payment of any eco-
nomic sanctions other than restitution as a condition of proba-
tion or parole.
137
 This provision is contrary to standard practices 
across the country, where payment of any criminal justice debt 
may be a condition of probation, parole, or other correctional 
supervision.
138
 These provisions provide sensible improvements 
to varying state practices given that restitution is proven to re-
duce recidivism amongst offenders and promote reintegration 
into law-abiding society.
139
   
Finally, and most important for this discussion, the revised 
Code creates the “reasonable financial subsistence” standard. 
Section 6.04(b) of the revised Code provides that “No economic 
 
explicitly intended to raise revenue.”); see also The Colbert Report (Comedy 
Central television broadcast June 11, 2014).  
 133. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.  
 134. See id. at 30 (discussing courts’ conflicts of interest).  
 135. EVANS, supra note 55, at 6; Ruback, supra note 79, at 1792–94. 
 136. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(10) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014) (“If the court imposes multiple economic sanctions including victim 
compensation, the court shall order that payment of victim compensation take 
priority over the other economic sanctions.”).  
 137. See id. § 6.03(8) (permitting “[g]ood-faith efforts to make payment of 
victim restitution under § 6.04A” as the only economic sanction that can be 
enforced as a condition of probation).  
 138. The Brennan Center concluded in 2010 that “[a]ll fifteen states stud-
ied in this report make at least some forms of criminal justice debt a condition 
of probation and parole, including for the indigent, putting individuals at risk 
of incarceration if a court finds that missed payments were willful.” BANNON 
ET AL., supra note 10, at 21.  
 139. See Ruback, supra note 79, at 1812–13.  
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sanction may be imposed unless the offender would retain suf-
ficient means for reasonable living expenses and family obliga-
tions after compliance with the sanction.”
140
 This provision 
acknowledges the reality that the massive growth in the crimi-
nal justice system has a concentrated effect on communities 
suffering from the most severe socioeconomic inequality.
141
 As 
such, the rise of economic sanctions has placed additional eco-
nomic burdens on the backs of those least capable of paying.
142
   
The “reasonable financial subsistence” standard improves 
economic sanctions in two ways. First, it confronts the reality 
that mass incarceration disproportionately affects socioeconom-
ically disadvantaged populations. As Bruce Western and Becky 
Pettit explain, “[m]ost of the growth in incarceration rates [be-
tween 1980 and 2008] is concentrated at the very bottom, 
among young men with very low levels of education.”
143
 By 
2008, 37% of black men without a high school diploma were in 
prison or jail.
144
 By comparison, only 12% of white men without 
a high school diploma were incarcerated.
145
 Incarceration is 
highly concentrated in urban communities of color that system-
ically lack economic stability.
146
 A 2011 study by the Pew Re-
search Center found that the median wealth of white house-
holds has grown to twenty times that of black households and 
eighteen times that of Hispanic households.
147
 While wealth de-
 
 140. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(6) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014).  
 141. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: 
INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 4–5 (2010), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/ 
CollateralCosts1pdf.pdf; WASH. OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., DETERMINING AND 
VERIFYING INDIGENCY FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE 19 (2014), available at 
http://www.opd.wa.gov/documents/0185-2014_Determining_Indigency.pdf (es-
timating that 80% to 90% of defendants qualify for indigent representation); 
Western & Pettit, supra note 88, at 8 (“The social inequality produced by mass 
incarceration is sizable and enduring for three main reasons: it is invisible, it 
is cumulative, and it is intergenerational.”).  
 142. See Reitz, supra note 14, at 1757–66 (stating that because most of-
fenders come from the lowest rungs of the socioeconomic ladder, “to require 
offenders to pay for government interventions that are forced upon them is 
regressive taxation taken to an extreme”). 
 143. Western & Pettit, supra note 88, at 10.  
 144. Id.  
 145. See id.  
 146. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6–7 (2010); TODD R. CLEAR, 
IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES 
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 3 (2007).  
 147. PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TWENTY-TO-ONE: WEALTH 
GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS 1 
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clined in all households during the Great Recession, it dipped 
disproportionately amongst minority households.
148
 Moreover, 
minority households have struggled more to recover wealth 
during the subsequent economic recovery.
149
 These realities il-
lustrate that incarceration disproportionately affects those 
communities that have the least economic stability. The “rea-
sonable financial subsistence” standard takes this into account 
by trying to assess how much income an individual requires to 
maintain their own families before determining how much the 
state may take as a method of punishment.
150
   
Second, this standard rises above the constitutional floor 
created by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on debtors’ pris-
ons. In Bearden v. Georgia, a Georgia court revoked a defend-
ant’s probation for failure to pay a $550 fine in the period pre-
scribed by the sentencing judge, and instead placed the 
individual in jail for the rest of his probation period.
151
 The Su-
preme Court struck down the incarceration period and re-
manded the case to the Georgia court for further analysis.
152
 As 
the Bearden Court explained, “if [a] probationer has made all 
reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot 
do so through no fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to 
revoke probation automatically without considering whether 
adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are 
available.”
153
 The Georgia court neither made an assessment of 
whether the defendant willfully failed to pay his fine; nor did it 
take into consideration alternatives, such as extending the pe-
riod for making payments, reducing the fine, or directing the 
probationer to do community service rather than make mone-
tary payment.
154
 As such, the Supreme Court held the revoca-
 
(2011), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth 
-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened 
Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
(Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial 
-wealth-gaps-great-recession.  
 150. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(6) cmt. h (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, 2014) (suggesting total economic sanctions be limited so offenders retain 
sufficient means for family obligations). 
 151. 461 U.S. 660, 663 (1982). The sentencing judge imposed a $500 fine 
and ordered the defendant to pay $250 in restitution for burglary and theft. 
Id. at 662. The defendant paid $200 upfront in accordance with the court’s or-
der, but failed to pay the $550 balance within the four month period ordered 
by the court. Id. at 662–63.  
 152. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 674. 
 153. Id. at 668–69. 
 154. Id. at 672–74 (“[T]he sentencing court could extend the time for mak-
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tion of probation unconstitutional.
155
 This case, along with a se-
ries of cases arising before the Court in that period, prohibits 
incarcerating an individual solely due to nonwillful inability to 
pay fines.
156
  
Here, the Code takes a pivotal step forward by trying to de-
fine parameters for ability to pay—namely, that an offender 
must retain sufficient finances for personal expenditures.
157
 
This principle values the law-abiding reintegration of offenders 
over considerations of retribution alone.
158
 While the Court in 
Bearden conceded that inability to pay may include failure to 
seek employment or borrow money as means to pay the debt 
owed to society,
159
 this new standard focuses on what the indi-
vidual needs to reintegrate rather than what that individual 
can do to change his or her situation. As such, this concept of 
reasonable subsistence is explicitly higher than the constitu-
tional floor.
160
 Moreover, by creating a cap on economic sanc-
tions, the Code requires courts to evaluate all the monetary 
fees and fines imposed on the individual. Courts must also as-
sess the ability to pay before the imposition of this sanction—a 
practice not routine among the courts. These are meaningful 
developments.  
Though these improvements are meaningful, the Code 
leaves legislatures and courts wide discretion to define reason-
able financial subsistence.
161
 The revised Code suggests that 
legislatures may go beyond the Code in defining an ability-to-
pay standard for use by the courts. It even goes so far as to pro-
vide proposed language for a provision.
162
 To the courts, the 
 
ing payments, or reduce the fine, or direct that the probationer perform some 
form of labor or public service in lieu of the fine.”).  
 155. Id. at 674.  
 156. See e.g., id.; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400–01 (1971); Williams v. 
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244–45 (1970).  
 157. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(6) cmt. h (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, 2014). 
 158. Id. (noting the goal of the Code is to not “allow economic penalties to 
override the goal of returning offenders to productive lives”). 
 159. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668 (“[A] probationer’s failure to make sufficient 
bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay the fine 
or restitution may reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes 
to society for his crime.”).  
 160. Id. (“Subsection (6) is based on grounds of public policy, not the mini-
mum requirements of Due Process. . . .”). 
 161. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 
3, 2014) (noting that “[s]ome jurisdictions may choose to adopt particularized 
rules to help implement the broad [reasonable subsistence] principle”). 
 162. Id. (“No economic sanction may be imposed on an indigent offender as 
defined by the state’s eligibility rules for appointment of counsel in a criminal 
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Comments explain, “reasonable financial subsistence” rises 
above the constitutional minimum set by federal law.
163
 This 
leaves wide discretion to courts in the absence of legislation. 
The Code falls short of defining reasonable financial sub-
sistence with specificity.
164
 The Code’s gap in definition reflects 
a policy decision to allow courts and legislators the opportunity 
to explore alternative working standards for reasonable sub-
sistence.
165
 Rather than define criteria, the Code defines the 
question with precision – whether the person could maintain 
reasonable financial subsistence while paying the fees and fines 
imposed by a court. As such, the Code asks courts to continue 
an analysis it already conducts: tailoring fees and fines to the 
circumstances of the individual.
166
 But without specified crite-
ria, there is room for courts to continue struggling with ability 
to pay analyses.  As a result, the disparities in sentencing that 
contribute to the offensiveness of economic sanctions are likely 
to persist.  
IV.  BUILDING ON THE CODE AND ROADBLOCKS TO 
REFORM   
In adopting the new Model Penal Code’s “reasonable finan-
cial subsistence” standard, most states would take a huge 
stride toward improving the use of economic sanctions in their 
courts. Nevertheless, the Code may not, and probably cannot, 
resolve persistent failure to pay court-imposed fees and the ac-
companying problems of criminal justice debt because they are 
symptoms of larger, systemic shortcomings. In this section, I 
briefly set forth practical reforms that build on the strides tak-
en by the Model Penal Code. I also identify two systemic trends 
that converge at the site of economic sanctions and criminal 
justice debt: underfunded courts and budget-cut criminal jus-
tice reform. For the reasons discussed here, the realities of the-
 
case. Qualification for or receipt of any of the following public benefits shall 
serve as evidence that the offender would not retain sufficient means for rea-
sonable living expenses and family obligations after compliance with one or 
more economic sanctions.”). 
 163. Id. (describing the relationship between reasonable financial subsist-
ence and federal constitutional law). 
 164. Id. (detailing different approaches states may take in implementing 
the reasonable financial subsistence principle). 
 165. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. h (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, 2014) (describing states’ ability to customize the principle for applica-
tion within its jurisdiction). 
 166. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1982) (describing “the gen-
eral flexibility of tailoring fines to the resources of a defendant”). 
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se trends will influence “improvement” of economic sanctions as 
much as the revised Model Penal Code itself.  
A. BUILDING ON THE CODE: PRACTICAL REFORMS TO INFORM 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
The imposition of onerous fees and fines is, on the one 
hand, an issue of lack of information. The amount of fees im-
posed on individuals can be difficult to quantify, and few un-
derstand or can assess the amount of fees and fines facing indi-
vidual offenders as they are processed through the criminal 
justice system.
167
 The Code addresses this information gap by 
making the sentencing judge the only purveyor of fees.
168
 To 
build on this, however, a central agency or entity should com-
pile information about the imposition of fees and fines to better 
understand their breadth. Sentencing commissions, already in 
existence, represent one agency that is well-equipped to further 
study this issue.
169
 These agencies typically collect data on sen-
tencing practices and trends, and issue policy recommendations 
on potential sentencing reforms to improve the justice sys-
tem.
170
 Often, these agencies aggregate data on characteristics 
of the individual offenders, the types of offenses imposed in the 
courts, and the length of sentence received by an offender.
171
 
Expanding the scope of their focus to include trends and prac-
tices in economic sanctions would be a logical expansion of sen-
tencing commissions’ role in informing judicial sentencing prac-
tices.  
An independent agency that follows the individual offender 
rather than the court could be another viable alternative. For 
example, Georgia created the Georgia Superior Court Clerks’ 
Cooperative Authority (GSCCCA) to monitor the collection of 
court-imposed fees and fines by the lower courts and standard-
 
 167. See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: 
Monetary Sanctions As Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 
513 (2011) (“It is not just the courts that have been authorized to impose mon-
etary sanctions; a broad range of criminal justice agencies now are permitted 
to levy such fees.”); ACLU, supra note 24, at 11 (calling for further data collec-
tion on the issue of criminal justice debt). 
 168. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(2) cmt. e (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, 2014) (“One guiding premise of § 6.04 is that all economic sanc-
tions . . . must be considered by sentencing courts as a package . . . [thus plac-
ing] the sentencing court in control of the total amount of all economic sanc-
tions that will be imposed on an offender.”). 
 169. See Logan & Wright, supra note 46, at 1215–26 (recommending sen-
tencing commissions as entities well-equipped to monitor LFOs).  
 170. Id. at 1215 (describing the current work of sentencing commissions). 
 171. See id. 
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ize their allocation.
172
 Using its CourtTRAX system, the 
GSCCCA centralizes information on the collection of fees and 
fines across the state as part of a “fees and fines project.”
173
 
Currently, the agency’s data collection does not capture the 
amount of fees and fines imposed on an individual offender, nor 
does it capture the amount of debt outstanding in the state.
174
 It 
could do this without much difficulty, however, given that it 
monitors fees and fines collection from all courts in the state.
175
 
A similar monitoring system could be created, either run 
through this agency or by a nonprofit organization, to follow 
the individuals providing the funding as well as the funds once 
collected by the court.
176
 
Another challenge is better informing the sentencing judge 
on how to assess an offender’s ability to pay. Judicial training 
programs and checklists would combat some of the quick re-
sponse solutions—including incarceration—that often befall in-
dividuals who fail to pay legal financial obligations when they 
appear before a court repeatedly.
177
 The Supreme Court of Ohio 
 
 172. See 2004 Ga. Laws ES3 (establishing the fees and fines project in 
Georgia and establishing the GSCCCA as the “collecting and remitting agent 
for the centralized collection and remittance of certain court costs and fees and 
certain additional penalties and bonds in criminal cases”).  
 173. Id. 
 174. See Ga. Superior Court Clerks’ Coop. Auth., Reports, COURTTRAX 
(2015), http://www.courttrax.org/reportsCanned.asp (describing the aggrega-
tion of reported data at the court level). 
 175. This includes collecting monthly reports on legal financial obligation 
collection from the superior courts, state courts, probate courts, municipal 
courts, magistrate courts and juvenile courts in the state. Id. 
 176. There are nonprofit organizations that monitor the amount of fees and 
fines imposed on individual offenders. For example, in 2008 the Rhode Island 
Family Life Center issued a report on its three year, independent study of 
court debt in the state. That report concluded that 18% of all jailings were on 
account of failure to pay court debts, which average $826 per offender. R.I. 
FAMILY LIFE CTR., COURT DEBT AND RELATED INCARCERATION IN RHODE 
ISLAND FROM 2005 THROUGH 2007, at 4 (2008), available at http://www 
.opendoorsri.org/sites/default/files/CourtDebt.pdf. More recently, the ACLU of 
Washington conducted a year-long study estimating that 20% of individuals 
incarcerated in the Benton County were incarcerated for failure to pay court 
debt, which averages $2,540 per case. ACLU OF WASH. & COLUMBIA LEGAL 
SERVS., MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS: THE WAYS COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS 
PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR 3–4 (2014), available at https://aclu 
-wa.org/LFO. Such reports suggest that monitoring systems need not be creat-
ed by state agencies alone, as nonprofit organizations demonstrate an ability 
to fill the gap in how much an individual faces in criminal justice debt and 
how collection is enforced.  
 177. Bret Crow, Bench Card Offers Guidance on Collection of Court Fines, 
Costs, COURT NEWS OHIO (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.courtnewsohio.gov/ 
happening/2014/benchCards_020414.asp#.VNKrXGTF9XY (describing the 
clarity provided by judicial training and reference materials regarding when 
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recently took steps to address this concern through the issu-
ance of “bench cards” for all state judges to clarify how better to 
address the collection of fees and fines.
178
 This two-page docu-
ment, circulated to all state judges, defines and distinguishes 
fines versus court costs, and details enforcement options for 
both types of legal financial obligations.
179
 By providing the 
courts with a list of collection methods, this measure may ne-
gate the impulse to incarcerate without full consideration of 
other enforcement methods.
180
 Alternatively, judges could re-
ceive training to understand the alternative sanctions that are 
available for failure to pay, including community service pro-
grams and alternative payment plan options.
181
 Such training 
would provide judges with information to better understand the 
offender’s ability to pay and their enforcement options.  
The revised Code’s “reasonable financial subsistence” 
standard combats this problem by requiring courts to obtain in-
formation to make the assessment.
182
 The actual method of in-
formation collection, however, is left unspecified. One method 
of assessment that makes sense is the presumption of a waiver 
of fees and fines where an individual already receives any pub-
lic welfare benefits. Indeed, the Code suggests this measure in 
the comments, though it is not set forth within the Code it-
self.
183
 This reform has practical appeal. In Maricopa County, 
Arizona, for example, the county courts provide fee deferrals for 
certain individuals whose income is less than 150% of the fed-
 
incarceration is appropriate for enforcing fines). 
 178. Id.  
 179. OFFICE OF JUDICIAL SERVS., SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, COLLECTION 
OF FINES AND COURT COSTS IN ADULT TRIAL COURTS 2 (2014), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/JCS/finesCourtCosts.pdf.  
 180. Id. (clarifying for judges that they are not allowed to use jail as a 
method of collection for costs). 
 181. Id. (describing two alternate methods of resolution: cancellation and 
community service). 
 182. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 
3, 2014). 
 183. In the comments to section 6.04, the Reporters set forth a provision 
that was “too specific to be included” but “consistent with the spirit of subsec-
tion (6),” which states:  
No economic sanction may be imposed on an indigent offender as de-
fined by the state’s eligibility rules for appointment of counsel in a 
criminal case. Qualification for or receipt of any of the following pub-
lic benefits shall serve as evidence that the offender would not retain 
sufficient means for reasonable living expenses and family obligations 
after compliance with one or more economic sanctions.  
Id.  
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eral poverty level.
184
 The deferral package allows the individual 
to share his or her financial situation with the court at an early 
stage in the criminal justice process, thus providing the sen-
tencing judge with additional information at sentencing.
185
 Rep-
licating such documentation in jurisdictions across the country 
would do much to give judges a sense of what types of financial 
obligations individuals face and how additional criminal justice 
debt could affect their ability to reintegrate into society success-
fully.  
B. ROADBLOCKS TO IMPROVEMENT: INTERSECTING TRENDS IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 
On a larger scale, the accumulation of economic sanctions 
and the accrual of criminal justice debt are the side effects of 
two larger trends in criminal justice reform. First, state courts 
are persistently underfunded, leading courts to seek revenue 
through economic sanctions.
186
 While economic sanctions al-
ways existed, additional fees and fines proliferated in the 
1990s.
187
 By 2003, the Conference of State Court Administra-
tors declared that state courts were facing “the worst fiscal cri-
sis in many decades.”
188
 This issue came to a head with the 
Great Recession of 2008. As one scholar notes, “[i]n most states, 
courts received 10 to 15 percent less funding in the years 2008 
through 2011 than they did in 2007.”
189
 By 2010, more than for-
 
 184. The fee deferral option exists for court fees or costs in family court, 
tax, civil, juvenile and mental health cases. SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZ., FEE 
DEFERRAL APPLICATION (2014), available at http://www.superiorcourt 
.maricopa.gov/sscDocs/packets/gnf1z.pdf (citing an income less than 150% of 
the federal poverty line as one basis for deferral).  
 185. Id. (noting the application is to be used “at the beginning of the case”). 
 186. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, POSITION PAPER ON STATE 
JUDICIAL BRANCH BUDGETS IN TIMES OF FISCAL CRISIS 2 (2003), available at 
http://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/Budget
WhitePaper.ashx (“State judicial systems . . . have found it difficult to obtain 
adequate resources even in good economic times.”).  
 187. In 1986, the Conference of State Court Administrators issued a set of 
standards related to court filing fees, surcharges, and miscellaneous fees in 
response to the burgeoning reliance upon courts to generate revenue to fund 
both the courts and other functions of government. See generally CONFERENCE 
OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT COSTS: FEES, 
MISCELLANEOUS CHARGES AND SURCHARGES AND A NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
PRACTICE (1986). The prevalence of the practice has expanded and intensified 
since the 1990s. See, e.g., CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, COURTS ARE 
NOT REVENUE CENTERS 1 (2012), available at http://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/ 
Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/CourtsAreNotRevenueCenters 
-Final.ashx (renewing examination due to persistence of the issue). 
 188. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, supra note 186, at 2.  
 189. Michael J. Graetz, Trusting the Courts: Redressing the State Court 
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ty states cut their courts’ funding.
190
 In response, state courts 
started seeking revenue to support their operational costs.
191
  
Whether judges impose more fees and harsher fines in 
light of fiscal scarcity is an issue that deserves more research. 
At the very least, state legislatures do not deter such action 
when they expand mandatory economic sanctions.
192
 In some 
instances, they are actively encouraging courts to use sanctions 
to supplement necessary operational costs. The Oklahoma state 
courts have collected more in the last five years than in any 
other time in state history.
193
 In response, the legislature de-
creased state appropriations to the courts, reducing their fund-
ing by seven percent in 2014.
194
 In fact, the state’s 2014 budget 
praises the courts for attaining “the highest court fund collec-
tions possible.”
195
 Such statements create a perverse incentive 
for judges to increase the imposition of fees and fines.
196
 It may 
also compromise judicial impartiality at sentencing.
197
  
Even where fees and fines do not directly fund court opera-
tional costs, they often will fund general state budgets or unre-
 
Funding Crisis, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 96, 97.   
 190. Id.  
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pact that revenue concerns have on court operations undermines the court’s 
role as a fair and impartial judicial body.”). The Brennan Center further as-
serts that similar perverse incentives exist at various points in the criminal 
justice system during the era of mass incarceration, from police and asset for-
feiture to prosecutors and conviction rate rewards. See CHETTIAR ET AL., supra 
note 43, at 11–12. 
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lated criminal justice system costs, such as rehabilitative pro-
grams unrelated to the particular individual’s offense.
198
 Such 
costs present a regressive tax on individuals in the criminal 
justice system to support government functions that the tax-
paying public enjoys without understanding the “real costs of 
enforcement.”
199
 As such, it can distort the public’s perception of 
how much the current justice system actually costs as well as 
the actual benefits or burdens gained from this system.
200
  
Second, the desire to cut costs through reforms in the crim-
inal justice system will influence and potentially prevent im-
provements to economic sanctions in the states. The United 
States finds itself at a pivotal moment in reshaping punitive 
policies that have sustained overreliance on incarceration for 
more than thirty-five years. Conservative and progressive 
lawmakers alike are calling for reconsideration of policies that 
harshly punish low-level, nonviolent offenders as a measure to 
save taxpayer money and improve the effectiveness of the jus-
tice system.
201
 In response, states are revisiting and expanding 
alternatives to incarceration, decriminalization of low-level 
crimes, and graduated sanctions.
202
   
But in reality, reducing incarceration costs money, too. Al-
ternatives to incarceration and treatment programs are less 
expensive than incarceration,
203
 but they are not without costs, 
many of which are being offset onto the individuals being pro-
cessed through the justice system. Individuals now pay for 
court-ordered supervision, electronic monitoring,
204
 drug test-
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ment for the actual costs of monitoring the individual); Samuel R. Wiseman, 
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lease programs already pay for the cost of their own monitoring.”).  
1868 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1837 
 
ing, drug treatment, diversion programs, and more.
205
 These al-
ternatives are necessary to reduce reliance on incarceration, 
but truly moving beyond mass incarceration—including using 
economic sanctions in a way that is productive and proportion-
ate—requires changing the way we punish for more than just 
cost-cutting reasons. It requires rethinking the role of punish-
ment in the criminal justice system and in society more broad-
ly.  
The Model Penal Code takes an important stride toward 
this type of fundamental rethinking, as it refocuses economic 
sanctions around the goal of successful reintegration into socie-
ty.
206
 There is reason to believe that broader public and political 
opinion has not similarly reoriented itself around this frame-
work, despite the apparent shift toward rehabilitative reforms. 
As I explain elsewhere, neorehabilitative reforms maintain the 
same framework of exclusion that created policies that in-
creased prison populations, even though the rhetoric of reform 
has changed.
207
 Accordingly, unless and until the public and 
politicians develop the will to fund a reintegrative system,
208
 
economic sanctions may be another alternative to incarceration 
implemented in the wrong way despite the ALI’s efforts to the 
contrary.
209
  
Though the revised Model Penal Code takes important 
steps to curtail the likelihood of excessive economic sanctions, 
their occurrence likely will not recede without either or both of 
these broader trends reversing course as well. Without addi-
tional funding, the courts have little incentive to engage in 
meaningful ability-to-pay determinations for offenders facing 
mounting criminal justice debt.
210
 Similarly, legislators have lit-
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tle incentive to encourage them to do so. Moreover, until states 
start investing more funds in alternatives to incarceration, 
lawmakers will try to offset the costs of justice system on indi-
viduals least likely to be able to pay.
211
 In turn, failure to pay 
criminal justice debt will persist. But as pressure to create cost-
effective alternatives to incarceration increase, there is little 
incentive to shift more of the costs toward the state and away 
from the individual. 
  CONCLUSION   
Economic sanctions are but one of a plethora of methods a 
court may select for punishment. Until this point, economic 
sanctions have been used as a supplement to reform rather 
than an alternative. The Model Penal Code intervenes at a crit-
ical juncture with a revised approach. The Code emphasizes 
that fees and fines are punishment in and of themselves, rather 
than a supplement. It also aptly places the court as a check on 
excessive fines from the legislature. But the interventions by 
the Model Penal Code alone will not eliminate the dispropor-
tionately severe effects this method of punishment inflicts on 
the poor through the creation of criminal justice debt. Addi-
tional reforms are necessary. Moreover, successful implementa-
tion of the revised Code’s policies is inextricably linked with 
other trends in justice reform. Unless advocates and lawmakers  
fund courts and move beyond the cost-cutting framework to 
justice reform, the efforts to improve economic sanctions in the 
states will remain tenuous at best.   
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